In this cryptosystem, we have considered RGB images for two-dimensional (2D) data security. Security of RGB images during transmission is a major concern, discussed globally. This paper proposes a novel technique for color image security by random hill cipher (RHC) over SLn(F) domain associated with 2D discrete wavelet transform. Existing techniques have discussed the security of image data on the basis of the keys only (which provide only one layer of security for image data), but in the proposed cryptosystem, the keys and the arrangement of RHC parameters are imperative for correct decryption of color image data. Additionally, key multiplication side (pre or post) with the RGB image data should inevitably be known, to correctly decrypt the encrypted image data. So, the proposed cryptosystem provides three layers of security for RGB image data. In this approach, we have considered keys from the special linear group over a field F, which provides enormous key-space for the proposed cryptosystem. A computer simulation on standard examples and results is given to support the fixture of the scheme. Security analysis, and detailed comparison between formerly developed techniques and proposed cryptosystem are also discussed for the robustness of the technique. This method will have large potential usage in the digital RGB image processing and the security of image data.
Introduction
Security of image data in an insecure network is a major issue. Image data is highly sensitive and is prone to being decoded abruptly by intruders. Cryptographic systems are used extensively, to ensure secrecy and authenticity of sensitive information. Cryptography allows us to transmit data in such a way, that it is understood only at the receiver end. The original image data is called the plaintext data, 27 which must be kept secure. The plaintext data changes into encrypted data by some algorithm, this encrypted data is known as ciphertext (encrypted image data), which is then transmitted through unsecured network. The procedure for secure transmission of RGB image data as well as the keys through insecure network is given in Fig. 1 . At the receiver's end, transmitted data is decrypted back into the plaintext. The aim of cryptography is to ensure high end communication between the sender and receiver without any loss of information. But cryptanalysts try to break the security of data, and this process is known as hacking. Security, refers to the following aspects-confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. In current time, maintaining the fidelity, security, and confidentiality of original image data is a critical issue. The security of image data, designed by existing techniques completely depends on the encryption key. If the attacker knows about the exact encryption key of these techniques, then he/she can recover the original image from encrypted image data. So, in these approaches, the security of encryption keys is also required. The technique 13 proposes novel cryptosystem for RGB images by random matrix affine cipher (RMAC) with discrete wavelet transform (DWT). In the approach, 13 each component of the RGB image data is separated, and then the algorithm is applied to it. The scheme 13 provides security of image data by the keys and the arrangement of RMAC parameters, which is two layer security (first layer security by keys and second layer security by the arrangement of RMAC parameters). Various schemes have been developed for security of image data; such as: the techniques 28, 11, 14, 29 propose security of image data using Fourier transform; the schemes 1,2,26,5 have given security of images in gyrator transform domain; the cryptosystems 3, 6, 16 have developed image encryption using Hartley transform; the techniques 4, 7, 12 have presented image coding by wavelet transform; the approach 15, 18, 25 have also proposed security of image data. According to, recent studies for the security of RGB image data, some attacks such as: brute-force attack, cropping attack, known-plaintext attack, 22 chosen-plaintext attack, 21 and chosen-ciphertext attack, etc. can penetrate into the existing techniques for security (robustness) of image data. But in this approach, the encryption and decryption process is based on two phase random hill cipher (TPRHC) over SL n (F) domain associated with two-dimensional (2D) DWT, which is designed to ensure secure transmission of color image data. Here, we have considered the highly sensitive parameters like: keys, arrangement of RHC parameters, and position (pre or post) of keys multiplication with image data for security purpose. So, the proposed cryptosystem provides, three layer security of RGB image data. And so, the proposed technique for RGB image data security by random hill cipher (RHC) associated with DWT is free from above listed attacks; because proposed cryptosystem provides three layer security of image data, and key-space of the proposed cryptosystem is exorbitant.
This technique is also capable of secure transmission of large size images. In this approach, the size of the original image is divided into equal size blocks (sub-image), such that the block size (order of sub-image) is same as size (order) of hill cipher keys, and the hill cipher keys are selected from SL n (F).
9,24 SL n (F) is a set of all n × n matrices whose determinant is 1, which forms a noncommutative group under the usual multiplication over the field F. Authors in Ref. 23 describe RGB image encryption using hill cipher and discrete wavelet transformation, which considers involutory matrix for the key, while Refs. 19 and 20 have considered self-invertible matrix (which is also involutory matrix) for hill cipher key. But in this cryptosystem, we have chosen RHC keys from SL n (F). Since SL n (F) is a non-abelian group and matrix multiplication is noncommutative, so the multiplication of hill cipher keys with the RGB image depends on pre or post multiplication. So position (pre or post) of key multiplication should inevitably be known, to correctly decrypt the encrypted RGB image. First, RHC is applied to each component (red (R), green (G) and blue (B) components) of a color image data before using the DWT, second, it is applied after DWT. We define it as TPRHC. When the 2D DWT 8, 10 is applied to the image data, the 2D image data decomposes into four sub-images; one of the sub-images are a low frequency sub-band which can be decomposed continuously and the others are high frequency sub-band in the horizontal direction (H), vertical direction (V ), and diagonal direction (D) kept without any changes. In this cryptosystem, 2D discrete wavelet transformation is applied to each component (red (R), green (G) and blue (B) components) of RGB image data. The procedure for decomposition of image data by DWT 8,10,17 is given in Fig. 2 . The back construction of images by inverse DWT is given in Fig. 3 . The DWT is extensively used in data compression, sound analysis, signal and image processing and image compression, etc.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we have explained the 2D DWT and RHC. The formula for color image encryption and decryption using RHC and DWT is given in the same section. Procedure of image encryption and decryption is mentioned in Sec. 3. Sensitivity analysis of the parameters is presented in Sec. 4. In Sec. 5, we have discussed the statistical analysis. The security analysis of the proposed cryptosystem is given in Sec. 6. A comparison between this approach and other related techniques is presented in Sec. 7. Finally, this cryptosystem has been concluded in Sec. 8.
Two-Dimensional Discrete Wavelet Transform and Random Hill Cipher
Here, we have used wavelet transform for decomposition of 2D data (image data). 2D DWT 10 is carried out in the row direction and column direction, separately. After DWT, the 2D signal (image data) is divided into four sub-bands: LL(lowlow) = A, HL (high-low) = H, LH (low-high) = V and HH (high-high) = D. The HL sub-band shows the variation along the x-axis and the LH sub-band indicate the variation along y-axis. The four sub-bands are down-sampled in the row and column directions, the total size of the four sub-bands is equal to the size of the original image data. In two dimensions, a 2D scaling function, ϕ(x, y), and wavelets, ψ H (x, y), ψ V (x, y) and ψ D (x, y), are required. 2D scaling function and wavelets are the products of two one-dimensional (1D) functions, that is
2D scaling function of DWT is given as
2D wavelet function of DWT is as follows
where index i identifies the directional wavelets, that assumes the values H, V and D. Equations (5) and (6) The original image h(x, y) is obtained via the inverse of 2D DWT (2D-iDWT) for given W ϕ (j 0 , n, m) and W i ψ (j, n, m) of Eqs. (7) and (8) .
Here h(x, y), ϕ j,n,m (x, y) and ϕ In this cryptosystem, we have applied RHC on an RGB image of size m × m. The pixels of an RGB image are divided into equal blocks, we call it as a block matrix (sub-image) of the original image, the sub-image size is same as key size of hill cipher, which is defined by the user. In our approach the encryption keys (hill cipher keys) are taken from SL n (F) domain such that n divides m. Suppose the user chooses a type of block matrix (sub-image), in which the order of the block matrix does not divides the order of the original image matrix (n m), then user needs to add some redundant rows or columns or both in the original image matrix. The procedure of block creation for color image data is illustrated in Fig. 4 . SL n (F) is the set of all n×n matrix that contains those elements of GL n (F) (Ref. 9) whose determinant is 1 over the field F. The mathematical definition of SL n (F) is as follows:
where, GL n (F) is general linear group over field F. Because SL n (F) contains those elements from GL n (F), whose determinant is equal to 1 (10), so the order of SL n (F) is very large. If F is finite field containing q elements then
where
. RHC for a sub-image of size n × n is given as:
where, B n×n be a block matrix (sub-image) of size n × n such that n | m, K n×n be a key matrix of size n × n from special linear group (10), and C n×n be a cipher block (encrypted sub-image) of size n × n. Inverse random hill cipher (iRHC) for sub-image of size n × n is given as:
where, adj(K n×n ) is adjoint of key matrix K n×n ∈ SL n (F), and P = 256. The same process is applied for remaining block matrix (sub-image) of the original color image. In Eq. (13), the position of adj(K n×n ) with C n×n is fixed according to the position of K n×n with B n×n (12) , because matrix multiplication is noncommutative. Suppose, if attacker multiplies adj(K n×n ) with C n×n (13) without knowing the exact position of K n×n with B n×n (12) , then original image cannot be recovered correctly.
Procedure and Results of the Proposed Cryptosystem
TPRHC over SL n (F) associated with DWT is applied to red (R), green (G), and blue (B) channels of an RGB image data. The encryption procedure for each component of the RGB image data is given in Fig. 5 , and decryption procedure for each component of the encrypted RGB image data is illustrated in Fig. 6 . In the first phase, we have three options for the RHC, which is applied to the RGB image data. Similarly, in the next phase also, three options are available for the RHC. Therefore, the total number of choices for RHC applied to the RGB image in complete process are 6! options. These phase options (6! options) mentioned here form the arrangement of the RHC (this is called the arrangement of RHC parameters). The procedure for encryption of an RGB image data is given in Fig. 5 . In the first phase, we applied K 1 (K 1R for red, K 1G for green and K 1B for blue) key for the parameters of RHC, then 2D-DWT is applied to partially encrypted RGB image data. Finally, K 2 (K 2R for red, K 2G for green and K 2B for blue) key is applied for second phase parameters of RHC. The same procedure is applied for decryption process which is delineated in Fig. 6 (inverse of second phase parameters of RHC), thereafter, inverse discrete wavelet transformation (iDWT) is applied on the partially decoded image. We apply K −1 1 (inverse of first phase parameters of RHC) key for iRHC at second phase. Then, finally original image is recovered. In this cryptosystem, we have used only seven keys (six key for RHC, and one key for discrete wavelet) for the encryption process. The size of hill cipher keys depends on the size of the block matrix (sub-images) of the original image, which ultimately depends on the choice of encoder (here, the encoder is free to choose any size of block matrix or sub-image) and hill cipher keys chooses from SL n (F) domain. But some existing approaches such as Refs. 23, 19 and 20 use particular (involutory matrix) and fixed size (size of the image) of the hill cipher key. The security of these techniques depends on the keys only; so, if the attacker knows about the exact key, then he/she can recover original image easily. In our approach, even if the decoder has the correct keys, but does not have the information about the correct arrangement of RHC parameters, so, he/she will not be able to recover the original image (for instance Figs. 7(d)-7(f)). So, this approach not only depends on keys, but also depends on the arrangement of RHC parameters. Furthermore, in this approach the information about the position (pre or post) of keys multiplication with RGB image data is also mandatory for correct decryption of the image data. Therefore, the proposed cryptosystem provides three level security to image data. Now proposed algorithm is applied to sparse and circular RGB image data. The encryption and decryption results for sparse image are given in Fig. 8 . shows that the proposed cryptosystem is also suitable for sparse image data. The procedure is also applicable to circular RGB image data, which is given in Fig. 9 . So proposed cryptosystem for image encryption and decryption is applicable for all types of color image data.
Sensitivity Analysis
The proposed technique for image encryption and decryption should be sensitive with respect to all parameters, which is used for security. High sensitivity is required for an unbreakable RGB image cryptosystems, i.e. the encrypted RGB image data cannot be decrypted correctly, even when the exact parameters are slightly changed. In this technique we have used: keys, arrangement of RHC parameters, and position (pre or post) of keys multiplication with image data for security, which are all highly sensitive. Figure 10 Fig. 10 represents that, the keys, position (pre or post) of keys multiplication, and wavelet are highly sensitive.
Statistical Analysis
The statistical analysis supports the robustness of the cryptosystem. In this section, we have discussed the distribution of data, before and after encryption and decryption. We have discussed about the mean square error (MSE) analysis, peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), correlation coefficient analysis between two images, and pixel intensity distributions of the images, which support the robustness of the proposed technique. 
Mean square error, peak signal-to-noise ratio, and correlation analysis of color image
The MSE between the original and reconstructed RGB image data for red (R), green (G) and blue (B) channels is computed by
where O and R e denote the original image and reconstructed image, respectively, N and M are the pixels of an image, and ∆x and ∆y are the pixel sizes.
The peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) between the original and reconstructed image is computed by
where O and R e denote the original and reconstructed images and MAX I is the maximum possible pixel value of the image. More generally, when samples are represented using linear pulse-code modulation (LPCM) with B 1 bits per sample, MAX I is 2 B1 − 1. Now, Correlation coefficient (C r ) of red (R), green (G) and blue (B) channels of original image (O) and reconstructed image (R e ) are computed by
where A and B are, respectively, mean of input (original image) and output (reconstructed image) images. The correlation coefficient between two images vary from −1 to +1, i.e. −1 ≤ C r ≤ +1. Two images A and B have a strong positive linear correlation if the correlation coefficient C r is close to +1. The −1 value of the correlation coefficient C r indicates a negative relationship between two images and the correlation coefficient zero represents that no relationship between two images. The MSE, PSNR and C r of red (R), green (G) and blue (B) channels of output and input color images are given in Tables 1-11 . Green channel of RGB image data 0.00 ∞ 1.00 3.
Blue channel of RGB image data 0.00 ∞ 1.00 Green channel of RGB image data 0.00 ∞ 1.00 3.
Blue channel of RGB image data 0.00 ∞ 1.00 Table 6 . Statistical analysis between Figs. 9(c) and 9(a).
S. No.
Channels of RGB image data MSE PSNR Correlation
1.
Red channel of RGB image data 0.00 ∞ 1.00 2.
Green channel of RGB image data 0.00 ∞ 1.00 3.
Blue channel of RGB image data 0.00 ∞ 1.00 The MSE values, PSNR and correlation coefficient of decrypted RGB image (Fig. 7(c) ) for red (R), green (G) and blue (B) channel are given in Table 1 Tables 7-11 , which shows that the encrypted image cannot be decrypted correctly if position (pre or post), and parameters are slightly changed. Thus, the error analysis of the color image data, represents that the proposed approach is robust against cryptanalytic because security of this approach not only depends on keys, but also on the arrangement of RHC parameters and position (pre or post) of keys multiplication with RGB image data. 
Pixel intensity distributions of the images at horizontal, vertical and diagonal pixels
The pixel intensity distributions at horizontal, vertical and diagonal pixels of the original image ( Fig. 7(a) ), encrypted image ( Fig. 7(b) ), and decrypted image (Fig. 7(c) ) are discussed in Figs. 11(a)-11(c) , respectively. The pixel intensity distributions at horizontal, vertical, and diagonal pixels of the encrypted image represent that no relation exists between two neighboring pixels. The pixel intensity distributions of the encrypted image are uniformly distributed in the domain, which is completely different from pixel distributions of the original image. The distribution of data of the encrypted image indicates that no information of the original image can be obtained from the encrypted image. So, the encrypted color image is secured from attacks. The pixel intensity distributions of the correctly decrypted image are exactly similar to the pixel intensity distributions of the original image, which represents that the original image has been completely recovered from encrypted image. Figures 12(a) and 12(b) represent that the arrangement of RHC parameters and position (pre or post) of keys multiplication are also providing security to RGB image data. Therefore, the proposed cryptosystem provides three layer security of RGB image data.
Histogram analysis of RGB image data
In this section, we have discussed about histogram of the RGB image data. One of the various benefits of the histogram is that, it shows the shape of the distribution for a larger set of data. Therefore, an image histogram provides a clear illustration of how the pixels in an image are distributed by plotting the number of pixels at each intensity level. Histogram of the original RGB image (Fig. 7(a) ) is given in Fig. 13(a) . Histogram of the encrypted image data (Fig. 7(b) ), correctly decrypted image (Fig. 7(c) ), and incorrectly decrypted color image data ( Fig. 7(d) ), separately is given in Figs. 13(b)-13(d) . The histogram of encrypted image data is totally different from the histogram of the original RGB image data, which represents that the encrypted RGB image data is completely different from the original RGB image data. Now, the histogram of the correctly decrypted image is exactly similar to the histogram of the original RGB image. This shows that the correctly decrypted image can be completely recovered from the encrypted image data without any impairment in the intensity and information of RGB image data. The histogram of Figs. 7(d), 7(e) and 7(f) is given in Figs. 13(d), 14(a) and 14(b) , respectively. These histograms are completely different from the original image histogram, which show that the arrangement of RHC parameters also provides security of RGB image data, while Figs. 14(c) and 14(d) respectively, which are different from the original image histogram. So, the position of keys multiplication and wavelet is also providing security for RGB image data. Finally, the distribution of data of images (histogram analysis of images) represents that the proposed technique for RGB image security forms a secure cryptosystem.
Security Analysis of the Proposed Cryptosystem

Key's space analysis of the proposed cryptosystem
In cryptography, an algorithm's key space refers to the set of all possible keys that can be used to generate a key, and is one of the most important attributes that determines the strength of a cryptosystem. A secure cryptosystem should have a large key space to exhaustively resist against attacks. In proposed cryptosystem, we have used six RHC keys, which are chosen from SL n (F); and SL n (F) contains those elements of GL n (F) whose determinant is 1. Thus, the order of SL n (F) is very large. So the key space of the whole cryptosystem is also large. In the case when finite field containing q elements, the key space for the hill cipher keys is
In this approach, we have considered six RHC keys (three for first phase and three for second phase) for security of an RGB image data. In each phase a user may choose different sizes of RHC keys. For large size of n and q, the key space of this cryptosystem is exorbitant. 
Robustness against cryptanalysis
We have discussed the robustness analysis of the proposed cryptosystem for an RGB image data. attack being applied to the encrypted color image data by the attackers has been shown in Fig. 15(a) . On the other hand, in chosen-ciphertext attack, a cryptanalyst tries to find a matching plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext, chosen randomly. Figure 15 (b) shows the procedure of chosen-ciphertext attack being applied to the encrypted image data by attackers. The proposed cryptosystem is robust against the known-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack because the security of RGB images by this cryptosystem not only depends on the exact keys, but also depends on the correct arrangement of RHC parameters. If the attacker knows about all the possible exact keys, but is not aware of the correct arrangement of RHC parameters, he/she cannot decrypt the image correctly ( Fig. 7(f) ). Now, the key space of this cryptosystem for an RGB image is very large, so the exhaustive key search is not possible for the attacker. Now, a would-be attacker who tries to get the exact keys and correct arrangement of RHC parameters will have to perform infeasible amount of attempts. Moreover, the position (pre or post) of keys multiplication also provides security to image data. Suppose, the attacker knows about all the exact keys and the correct arrangement of RHC parameters, but does not have any information about the exact position (pre or post) of keys multiplication with the image data, then he/she cannot recover the original image ( Fig. 10(b) ). Hence, it is not feasible to perform exhaustive search for the correct keys, appropriate arrangement of RHC parameters, and the exact position (pre or post) of the keys multiplication all together, for any attacker. Application of algebra and DWT in 2D data 
Encrypted RGB image data occluded with 25% pixels
We have discussed about the robustness of the proposed cryptosystem when the encrypted RGB image data is occluded with 25%. Encrypted color image data ( Fig. 7(b) ) is occluded from the left and right with 25% pixels, which is given in Figs. 16(a) and 16(b), respectively; Fig. 16(e) is the decrypted image of Fig. 16(a) , when the exact keys and the correct arrangement of RHC parameters are applied; similarly, Fig. 16(f) is the decoded image of Fig. 16(b) when all the exact parameters are used. These analyses represent that the proposed cryptosystem is robust against occluded encrypted RGB image data by 25% from left as well as right. Now, the encrypted RGB image data ( Fig. 7(b) ) is occluded from the top and bottom with 25% pixels, which is shown in Figs. 16(c) and 16(d), respectively, and corresponding decrypted image is presented in Fig. 16 (g) and 16(h), respectively with all the exact keys and the correct arrangement of RHC parameters. These analyses indicate that the proposed technique is also robust against occluded encrypted RGB image data 25% from top and bottom. So, it is confirmed that in all cases, the encrypted RGB images can be successfully decrypted with partial RGB image data. parameters is incorrect then a totally different image is obtained (Fig. 17) . So, the arrangement of RHC parameters is also sensitive for occluded image data. By analyzing all the above facts, we can say that proposed approach is robust against cropping attacks.
Comparison of the Proposed Technique with Existing Methods
The proposed approach has been compared with Samson and Sastry 23 and Panduranga and Naveen Kumar.
20 Samson and Sastry 23 have taken the hill cipher key as an involutory matrix (A 2 = I), here the key's space of this technique is very small. So, brute-force attack is easily applicable on it. In technique, 23 no information about the block matrix (sub-images) is given, therefore for large size of image, the size of key will also be large, and in the worst case the number of inputs for hill cipher key can be upto the image size (for instance, a color image of size 512 × 512 × 3, the total number of inputs required for hill cipher key are 786,432), so it is cumbersome for the encoder to perform encryption and decryption processes. Also, no information is provided about MSE analysis, PSNR, correlation coefficient, and histogram analysis for the robustness of the approach. In addition to this, it is also time consuming to give enormous amount of inputs for large size images (as mentioned above).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel cryptosystem for RGB image data by TPRHC over SL n (F) domain associated with 2D DWT, which provides three layers of security for RGB image data. In the proposed cryptosystem, the encryption process is usual, but decryption process is more inconvenient, specifically in the case when there is no information available about the correct keys and the correct possible arrangement of RHC parameters. Even if the attacker knows about all the possible correct keys, but is not aware of the correct arrangement of RHC parameters, then he/she cannot recover the original information from the encrypted data. So the approach, not only depends on the possible correct keys, but also on the correct arrangement of RHC parameters. Another advantage of this technique is that, we have used matrix multiplication, which is noncommutative, so the decryption process also depends upon the position (pre or post) of multiplication of inverse hill cipher keys with the encrypted image (on the same position of hill cipher keys used in the encryption process); so if no information is available about the position of keys multiplication, then the attacker cannot recover the original image data. We have discussed, the security analysis and the comparison between the proposed technique and the existing methods for the robustness of the cryptosystem. The MSE values, PSNR, and correlation coefficient values of the correctly decrypted RGB image for red (R), green (G) and blue (B) components are "zero", "infinite", and "1", respectively, which indicate that the proposed cryptosystem provides security for RGB image data without any impairment of sensitive information. Therefore, the proposed technique can be used for efficient and secure transmission of color image data through unsecured channels without the fear of impairment of sensitive information. In the near future, it will have widespread applications in digital image processing and the security of RGB image data.
